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Abstract
We investigate a Deep Learning based system for malware detection. In
the investigation, we experiment with different combination of Deep Learn-
ing architectures including Auto-Encoders, and Deep Neural Networks with
varying layers over Malicia malware dataset on which earlier studies have
obtained an accuracy of (98%) with an acceptable False Positive Rates (1.07%).
But these results were done using extensive man-made custom domain fea-
tures and investing corresponding feature engineering and design efforts. In
our proposed approach, besides improving the previous best results (99.21%
accuracy and an False Positive Rate of 0.19%) indicates that Deep Learning
based systems could deliver an effective defense against malware. Since it
is good in automatically extracting higher conceptual features from the data,
Deep Learning based systems could provide an effective, general and scal-
able mechanism for detection of existing and unknown malware.
Keywords: Malware, Deep Learning, Machine Learning, Auto Encoders,
Deep Neural Networks, Malicia, Cyber Security.
∗E-mail: ssahay@bits-goa.ac.in
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
05
88
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 S
ep
 20
18
1 Introduction
Various attempts have been made in the past to detect and classify malware from
benign programs. These methods range from the early-day signature-based detec-
tion to the more modern Machine Learning and Deep Learning based detection.
Besides the detection techniques, the features used and data processing also
plays a major role in such studies. Some researchers suggest that opcode frequency-
based detection is superior to signature-based detection [1]. The study by Santos
et al. 2013 claims to have obtained an accuracy of 95.9% using opcode frequency
as features.
Later on, researchers also applied file-size based segmentation on the opcode
frequency and improved the average accuracy over different Machine Learning
models slightly above 96% (96.28%), and claimed that Random Forest provided
the best individual accuracy close to 98% (97.95%) with a False Positive Rate
(FPR)) of 1.07% [2] using the malware samples from the Malicia project data [3].
We did not use any custom feature engineering techniques like the segmen-
tation method as used in the above work, instead, we use the opcode frequency
directly as used in the study by Santos et al. [1]. We used different architectures
of Auto-Encoders (AE) for feature extraction (along with scaling the data) and
achieved a much better accuracy of 99.21% with even a better False Positive Rate
(FPR) of 0.19% using just a 4-layer Deep Neural Network (DNN) for classifica-
tion with a 3-layer AE for feature extraction.
Our work indicates that Deep Learning based architectures such as Auto-
Encoders (for Feature Extraction) and Deep Neural Networks (for malware clas-
sification) may provide a very effective system for defense against many types of
malware, that too without devising any custom features preparation techniques,
yet provide much better accuracy that too at a much lower FPR.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
different approaches used for malware detection in the past. Section 3 explains
the Malicia project and the malware and benign files used, and section 4 covers
the approach for converting these executable into structured data for deep learning
application. Section 5, and 6 covers the deep learning approaches for feature ex-
traction (AE) and modeling (DNN). The results are stated and analyzed in Section
7, and some conclusions and ideas for future work are given in Section 8.
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2 Related work on Malware Detection
There are two types of approaches to identify a MALWARE (or a MAL-icious
soft-WARE) from a benign software, namely the static analysis and the dynamic
analysis.
In the static approach, signatures or other important static features [4] [5] are
extracted from the software file or its associated meta-data without running or
executing it and then the detection algorithm is applied on these extracted signa-
tures or features. Some examples of such features are Portable Executable, strings
and byte sequences [5], and function length frequency. Whereas in the dynamic
analysis, the software is run or executed, and then important behavioral aspects
and features are captured, and the detection algorithm is run on such behavioral
features and observations.
There also exists approaches where multiple static, dynamic or hybrid ap-
proaches in which features from both static and dynamic analysis could be com-
bined, and there also exists methods like binary/ opcode analysis which could
fall in either or both type of analysis depending upon how involved the feature
extraction method is. Usage of opcode based features started gaining popular-
ity. There is some work in which directly opcode frequency distribution has been
used [2] [6] [7] [8] [9], whereas in others the opcode sequences and permutations
have been found useful [10].
Direct signature-based and simple static methods have a lot of shortcomings,
especially when used for detecting the second generation Polymorphic, and Meta-
morphic malware, and hence most active research has migrated to more sophisti-
cated techniques like Machine Learning and Deep Learning.
In the Machine Learning and related approaches, typically a supervised learn-
ing or classification algorithm is applied on the collected features for detection
(binary model for differentiating between malware and benign software) or clas-
sification (multinomial model for distinguishing across the family of malware).
Some examples of such supervised models are instance-based learning algorithms
[4], TF-IDF [1] [4], Naive Bayes [4], Support Vector Machine [1] [4], Decision
tree [4], ID3 [11], J48 [11] [2], Hidden Markov Models [12], Random Forest [2]
and AdaBoost [13].
Optionally, instead of applying the supervised learning model directly on the
collected features, some sort of feature selection [14], feature engineering or fea-
ture/dimension reduction [15] algorithms could be additionally used before super-
vised learning. A popular way for feature engineering is to use an unsupervised
learning algorithm for making better representative features for the supervised
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learning stage. Some example of feature selection methods used are hierarchi-
cal [11], unary variable removal [16], Goodness evaluator [17], and Weighted
Term Frequency [1].
Some drawbacks of conventional supervised learning methods are that a lot
effort and domain expertise is required in creating and identifying important fea-
tures [18], high false positive rates from such techniques, and their assumptions
are too simple (naive) to provide higher conceptual features [19]. Due to these
shortcomings, Deep Learning based techniques are gaining a lot of traction in
malware detection.
A lot of recent efforts has been focused on and success achieved with differ-
ent Deep Learning techniques like Deep Belief Networks [20], Deep Neural Net-
works [21], Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) and its variants like Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [19] and combination of
recurrent and convolutional neural networks [22] for supervised learning and clas-
sification. Similarly, for feature engineering and lower dimensionality feature ex-
traction Deep Belief Networks (DBN) and (Stacked) Auto-Encoders (SAE/ AE),
and RNN based Auto-Encoders (RNN-AE) [18] have been used.
3 Malware Data Used
Malware data was collected from the Malicia project. The project contains al-
most 11,368 malicious files, from which assemble codes were extracted using the
Unix’s objdump utility which succeeded in generating the assemble (*.asm) files
for 11,084 files.
Another sample of 2819 benign executable files was collected from different
windows systems and ‘Cygwin’ utility, and each file in the sample was verified
to be non-malicious using the virustotal.com file scanner services. This dataset
with almost 11,000 malicious and approx. 2,800 benign samples, leads to class
imbalance problem, which was resolved using the Adaptive Synthetic (ADASYN)
oversampling technique
4 Structured Data Generation
From the generated Assemble Code file for each malicious and benign executable,
their unique opcodes were extracted and a such extracted unique opcodes made.
The set was converted into an index, where each unique opcode was assigned an
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integer. A total of over 1600 unique opcodes were indexed this way (we will call
this list as the ‘master opcode list’).
Next using the index of the master opcode list, the frequency of occurrence
of each of the available opcode was measured in each assemble file and recorded
against them in a single row in a file called opcode frequency (this is done sep-
arately for benign and malicious files, and then merged into a single file). Addi-
tionally, a label (0 or 1) corresponding to whether the data in a given row is from
a benign (0) or a malicious (1) executable.
Further, these frequencies were scaled between [0, 1]. We use the scaled fre-
quencies of occurrence of each code in each file (as X features) with the respective
file labels (as Y labels) as our dataset, which was further split into training (2/3rd)
and test (remaining 1/3rd) data splits randomly. This training and test sets were
used as described in the following sections on data processing and modeling.
5 Feature Extraction/ Dimensionality Reduction
Two different variants of (Stacked) Auto-Encoders were used for the purpose of
feature extraction, or dimensionality reduction. These were:
• A single layer (1-encoder, 1-decoder for training) Auto-Encoder, here re-
ferred as 1-layer AE (or Non-Deep Auto-Encoder as named here).
• A 3-layer (Stacked) Auto-Encoder (3-encoders, followed by 3-decoders for
training), here referred as 3-layer AE (or Deep Auto-Encoder as named
here).
Auto-Encoders are unsupervised learning algorithms and do not require the actual
labels for training, hence only the X features (opcode frequencies).
All Auto-Encoder layers use Exponential Linear Units (ELU) as activation
except for the last layer which uses linear activation as we intend to predict a
continuous variable to reconstitute the input. The bottleneck layer in both auto
encoders contains 32 nodes. The 3-layer AE additionally use 128, and 64 node
hidden layers in encoder and decoder (Architecture/Node-count: Input-128-64-
32-64-128-Output), whereas, in 1-layer AE, the encoder/ decoder directly con-
nects the bottleneck layer (32) to input/ output layer (Architecture/Node-count:
Input-32-Output).
Mean square error, which is the mean of the squared error over samples in a
batch, has been used as loss function for training the Auto-Encoders as the scaled
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features represent continuous variables. Both AE here use ADAM optimizer and
were trained for 120 epochs with a batch size of 64 samples in each batch.
The corresponding figure (Figure 1) shows the training and validation (test)
losses across epochs during the training of one of the Auto-Encoders.
6 Modeling
Three Deep Neural Network models were used with features extracted from both
of the above Auto-Encoders. These models are:
• A 2-hidden layer Deep Neural Network, here named as 2L-DNN.
• A 4-hidden layer Deep Neural Network, here named as 4L-DNN.
• A 7-hidden layer Deep Neural Network, here named as 7L-DNN.
All deep neural networks layers use ELU as activation except for the last layer
which uses softmax activation.
All deep neural networks use ADAM optimizer, binary cross entropy loss
function, and 0.1 dropout [23] in each of the hidden layer. Since we require a
binary classification, therefore the output layer contains only 1 node with Sig-
moid activation. All the other layers use ELU activation. All the DNNs were
trained for 120 epochs, with a batch size of 64 samples.
The 7-layer DNN (7L-DNN) contains 211−i nodes (1024, 512, ..., 16 nodes) in
the ith hidden layer (as counted from the input layer), and the 4-layer DNN (4L-
DNN) contains 212−(2×i) nodes in the ith hidden layer (1024, 256, 64, 16 nodes).
The 2-layer DNN (2L-DNN) contains 1024, and 32 nodes in the respective 2
hidden layers.
Below is a sample plot (Figure 2) showing a loss as a function of epochs
across the training iterations. After each training, the model is tested on the test
set, and corresponding validation losses have been computed at each epoch. The
asymptotic nature of these plots indicates convergence which suggests that the
training is satisfactory with respect to the used hyper-parameters.
One observation with respect to this plot is that at occasions the training loss
is more than the validation loss, which seems counter-intuitive at first, but there
are two explanations for this. First is that we use dropout (regularization) during
training [23], which is removed during validation, this though avoids over-fitting
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Figure 1: Sample plot showing training and validation loss (y-axis) across each
epoch (x-axis) during training of an AE.
but increases the training loss as many neurons are ’off’ during training randomly.
The second reason is that the training loss is average across the samples in a train-
ing batch, whereas the validation loss is computed after the weights are optimized
in each epoch for that epoch, this gives an impression of lower validation loss as
compared to training loss for a given epoch.
7 Results
The table below (Table 1) shows the True Positive, False Positive, True Negative
and False Negative instance counts with different AE and DNN combination.
Where,
• TP = true positives; malware identified as malware.
• FP = false positives; benign identified as malware.
• TN = true negatives; benign identified as benign.
• FN = false negatives; malware identified as benign.
The Table 2 shows the performance evaluation (on test set) for the different
combination of AE and DNN used. It gives the False Positive Rate (FPR), True
Positive Rate (TPR), True Negative Rate (TNR), Positive Predictive Value (PPV)
and the Accuracy (Acc.). where,
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Figure 2: Sample plot showing training and validation loss (y-axis) across each
epoch (x-axis) during training of a DNN.
AE DNN TP FP TN FN
1L-AE 2L-DNN 3481 23 3612 200
1L-AE 4L-DNN 3451 44 3591 230
1L-AE 7L-DNN 3618 11 3624 63
3L-AE 2L-DNN 3630 157 3478 51
3L-AE 4L-DNN 3630 7 3628 51
3L-AE 7L-DNN 3238 25 3610 443
Table 1: Performance results (instance counts) with different combinations of AE
and DNN.
• FPR = FP/(FP + TN)
• TPR = TP/(TP +FN); also denoted as Sensitivity, Recall or Hit Rate.
• TNR = TN/(TN + FP ); also denoted as Specificity.
• PPV = TP/(TP + FP ); also denoted as Precision.
• Accuracy = TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
× 100%
Summarizing the findings from above tables, we find from the below Accuracy
(Figure 3) and FPR (Figure 4) plots that 3-layer AE with 4-layer DNN gives the
best combination of accuracy (99.21%) and FPR (0.19%) simultaneously. On the
other hand, 3-layer AE with 7-layer DNN offered the lowest accuracy, though
at an FPR of 0.69% it is not only comparable to but also much better than that
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AE DNN FPR TPR TNR PPV Acc.
1L-AE 2L-DNN 0.0063 0.9457 0.9937 0.9934 96.95
1L-AE 4L-DNN 0.0121 0.9375 0.9879 0.9874 96.25
1L-AE 7L-DNN 0.0030 0.9829 0.997 0.997 98.99
3L-AE 2L-DNN 0.0432 0.9861 0.9568 0.9585 97.16
3L-AE 4L-DNN 0.0019 0.9861 0.9981 0.9981 99.21
3L-AE 7L-DNN 0.0069 0.8797 0.9931 0.9923 93.60
Table 2: Performance results (rates) with different combinations of AE and DNN.
obtained in previous studies. One interesting finding from these plots could also
be that combining a deeper 3-layer AE with shallower DNNs (2-layer and 4-layer)
provides much better results than when combined with deeper DNN (7-layer),
which is exactly the opposite trend when the shallower 1-layer AE is combined
with deeper 7-layer DNN. In-fact the 7-layer DNN gives the worst performance
with 3-layer AE and the best performance with 1-layer AE. One explanation for
this finding could be that a combination of complex-features (deeper the networks,
more complex could be the function fit) function and complex-classifier function
is leading to overfitting. This trend manifests itself, to also enable the simpler
1-layer AE to give the second best performance both from accuracy perspective
(9˜9%) and FPR perspective (0.30&) when combined with the deepest DNN (7-
layer).
Figure 3: Accuracy for different combinations of AEs and DNNs.
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Figure 4: False Positive Rates for different combinations of AEs and DNNs.
8 Conclusion
To the best of our understanding, this is the first study that could produce such
results where we improved the previous best accuracy by 1.26% (99.21% as com-
pared to 97.95%) while simultaneously also improving FPR by 5.6 times (0.19%
as compared to 1.07%) on the Malicia dataset. The results become more impor-
tant because we have just followed the suggested best practices for Deep Learning,
and besides that, we did not create or implemented any expert-designed custom
features as was done in some of the previous studies that improved prediction
accuracy and FPRs on Malicia data earlier.
Since we did not create any custom domain features and had used only the op-
code frequency directly (as-is) for feature selection/ extraction and classification,
a more direct comparison could be with the best results under similar conditions
of using opcode frequency directly. Under these constraints, we took even a larger
leap and improved the accuracy by 3.31% (99.21% as compared to 95.9%) while
simultaneously improving FPR by 10.5 times (0.19% as compared to 2.0%) from
the previous best results of studies done (using opcode frequency directly) on
Malicia data.
Another contribution of our investigation is comparing different combinations
of Auto-Encoder and Deep Neural Network (of varying layers) combinations to
see how effective each combination is, and surprisingly the best combinations did
not come from either of the extremes (very deep or shallow networks).
This investigation goes a long way to prove that effective implementation of
end-to-end deep learning architectures from feature extraction to classification
could provide very credible, general and scalable defense against many types of
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malware, without requiring any special feature engineering requirements. This
aspect of deep learning to automatically extract higher conceptual features from
data is very useful in making a general malware defense mechanism that could
work against many malware families and types without much incremental effort.
Since some of the previous works had already attained very good (over 95%)
accuracy with Malicia dataset, as a proposal for further work, we believe that
using a more complex dataset of Meta/Poly-morphic malware could help further
differentiate deep learning based Malware defense mechanisms against previous
approaches. This is evident from the fact that the data was not complex enough
to get the best out of the deepest AE and DNN combination in the study. Further,
it will also be interesting to see how different other deep learning techniques and
architectures like RNN, LSTM, ESN, etc. perform, especially when coupled with
the more advanced data processing and feature engineering methods to enable a
comprehensive malware defense system.
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